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*Paper presented at the conference on "Locational Competition in the World Economy," Kiel,
22-23 June 1994. I am grateful to the discussant Arye Hillman and other conference participants
for valuable comments. Discussions with Devashish Mitra were also very helpful in preparing
the final version of the paper. Arye Hillman's published comment goes far beyond the normal
duties of a discussant and constitutes a valuable independent contribution to what I hope will be
an ongoing discussion of these very interesting issues.
The Philosophy of Locational Competition
While Standortswettbewerb may be a familiar term in the German economics literature,
with a long tradition in location theory going back to von Thunen and Losch, its English
counterpart "locational competition" does not ring any bells, at least to me. One possible
meaning, it would seem, is the choice of sites by firms at which to locate various production or
marketing facilities to maximize their profits, given what their competitors are doing. It would
thus constitute the geographical dimension of competition between oligopolists and as such
would bring into play the full panoply of the location theorist's exotic arsenal of hexagons,
isodapones, and whatever else have you.
Somehow I do not think that this is what Professor Horst Siebert had in mind when he
invited me to write a paper on this subject, which is the theme of our conference. What he
appears to want us to understand by this phrase is rather competition between nations, not firms,
to attract within their borders as much as possible of global pools of internationally mobile
factors, thus raising the incomes of complementary immobile factors confined within those
borders. In any case, this is the sense in which I will interpret the term in this paper.
Before undertaking the analysis of this problem, however, it is necessary to examine the
question of whether it is legitimate to consider nations as competing between themselves at all,
in the sphere of trade and economic matters in general, as opposed to traditional geopolitical
conflict of interest. In the classical theory of international trade it was until recently taken for
granted that the basis of trade was mutual gain or "win-win," a context in which it is an absurd
fallacy to imagine that one party's gain might be at the expense of the other party's loss. The
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economist's vision of international relations, from Ricardo and Mill to Meade and Ohlin, has
been a benign and peaceful one in which the concept of competition is applicable only to firms
and not between nation-states.
And yet there are major exceptions to this generalization. In the case of the "optimal
tariff argument, the imposing nation gains and its passive partner loses, just as in poker or war.
The possibility of retaliation raises all of the standard issues in the analysis of conflict that we are
familiar with from the literature of game theory. No wonder that Edgeworth wanted to label
"poison" the article in which he first noted the possibility of an "optimum" tariff! Recently there
has been an extensive literature on so-called "strategic trade policy" in which nation-states each
back their own oligopolists in a global competition for rents and profits. We thus seem to be
back in the world of the Mercantilists, with Britain, France, and Holland blending trade policy
with naval policy in their struggle over the profits of the East Indian spice trade and the riches of
the New World.
While competition between nations is a highly controversial and dubious topic in the
scholarly academic literature, it is a staple of the thriving popular literature on "what's wrong
with America" or "why is, or is it was, Japan No. 1." A number of writers, such as Lester
Thurow, Michael Porter, James Fallows and Edward Luttwak have all examined various aspects
of American economic performance, and recommended adopting sundry foreign practices, such
as the German apprenticeship system, or MITI-type policies of industrial intervention, as
antidotes for what they perceive to be its grave deficiencies. Paul Krugman (1994), who has
certainly been the most creative academic contributor to arguments for activist trade and
industrial policies, has recently scathingly attacked all of these writings for shallowness,
irrelevance, and being just plain wrong factually and logically.
Despite its fair share of such errors and other infelicities, a well-known popular book of
this genre, The Work of Nations by Robert Reich (1991), conceives of the American economic
problem in precisely the framework of "locational competition" that we have as our agenda for
this conference. Contrary to some of his earlier writings, he here eschews protectionism,
industrial policy, and other attempts to "pick winners." He does, however, advocate policies to
refurbish the country's decaying physical infrastructure and to improve the system of public
education. These measures, he feels, will attract a higher share of global capital,
entrepreneurship, and new technology to the country and raise the living standards of the
American worker as a result.
Since Robert Reich is Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration, and a highly
influential member of his inner circle in addition, his views are of considerable interest as a
possible framework for the administration's approach to its global economic strategy. In Europe
and Japan also specific trade interventions and industrial regulations are getting to be out of
fashion, as well as being inconsistent with the thrust of GATT and other global and regional
agreements. Infrastructure and public education are increasingly coming to the fore as major
components of a new, market-friendly type of governmental activism that is not at all
inconsistent with what Adam Smith long ago regarded as the right and proper "duties of the
sovereign."
The question now becomes what are the determinants of the levels of physical
infrastructure and public education in the general allocation of economic resources between
productive sectors in a world of international capital mobility and free trade in goods and
services. What impact do they have on production, trade, and the prices of the factors of
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production? What are the international implications of national measures to influence the levels
of these variables?
It is surprising that there does not exist at the moment, at least to my knowledge, any
readily available framework within which these issues can be discussed.1 There is of course an
extensive literature on each aspect of the problem, such as international capital mobility, human
capital, and public goods such as "physical" infrastructure, but they have not been combined
together in an integrated whole. I have therefore found it a major intellectual challenge to
attempt to put together, if only within a very simple and highly stylized structure, a framework
within which the interplay of these factors may be considered.
The model that I will now attempt to sketch is meant to be purely exploratory and is
defective in many obvious respects. I am congenitally incapable, however, of thinking without
the discipline of some such analytical construct. The components of the model will be drawn
from some of my previous work, on human capital and trade in Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983)
and Findlay (1993), and on public inputs, infrastructure, trade, and capital mobility in
Clarida and Findlay (1991, 1992, 1994), which in turn draw on a model of government and the
economy first presented in Findlay and Wilson (1987).
Let us consider an economy that produces two final private goods, one of which, X, is a
"high-tech" sector that uses physical capital Kand skilled labor S as inputs in a constant returns
to scale production function, with diminishing returns to each factor with a fixed amount of the
other and complementarity in production between the factors, so that an increase in the quantity
of one raises the marginal productivity of the other. The other branch of the private sector of
production, Y, uses physical capital and ordinary unskilled labor L as inputs in a production
function with the same formal properties as X.
So far our specification corresponds to the familiar Ricardo-Viner model of Jones (1971)
with physical capital as the common "generic" factor and skilled and unskilled labor as the
"specific" factors.2 We depart from this familiar world, however, to follow the specification of
Clarida and Findlay (1992) that the productivity of both branches of the private sector of the
economy is enhanced by government expenditures on a public intermediate input,
"infrastructure." Furthermore, the "high-tech" sector X is more responsive to the public input
than the other sector Y. This makes the marginal rate of transformation between the two goods,
and not just the level of productivity, a function of the level of the public input. It will be





We also assume that
A'(LA)>0,A"(LA)<09A(0)=l
and
0 < n < l
Kx and Ky are the amounts of physical capital used in each sector, S is the economy's
stock of skilled labor, all of which is used inX, and LA and Ly are the amounts of unskilled labor
used in the public input and the Y sector.3 In addition, unskilled labor LQ is used to provide final
public services or amenities.
Ordinary or unskilled labor can transform itself into skilled labor by undergoing a costly
process of education or human capital formation. We define the rate of return on human capital
formation, p, as
p = p[e,s] (3)
where 6 is the ratio of the skilled wage v to the unskilled wage w. By arguments familiar
from the labor economics literature, and demonstrated explicitly in a general equilibrium context
in Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983), equation (3) has the properties that
5£>0 ^£<0ae >Kf,ds <u
i.e. a rise in the wage differential raises the return to human capital formation and a rise in the
amount of skilled labor available reduces it.4 The manpower constraints for the economy are that
S+L=N (4)
and
LA+LG+LY = L (5)
where N is the fixed number of workers of both types, with the division between skilled S and
unskilled L being endogenous.
We assume that the economy is a "small open economy," with the relative price j? of X
and the rate of interest f given by world markets. Perfect competition and international capital
mobility then result in:
§ ( ± r = r (6)
§y ±r=r (7)
i.e. the marginal value product of physical capital in each sector will be equal to the world rate of
interest. Since the input ratios uniquely determine the marginal value products of skilled labor in
X and unskilled labor in Y as well, we have
% ! f y l » = v (8)
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§y r0^ = w (9)
as the equilibrium values of v and w in the small open economy.
Since 9 is defined as the ratio of v to w, it follows that
ae _ Q(\-\X)A'(LA) „
dLA A(LA) > U \iK))
i.e. the wage ratio is an increasing function of the level of the public intermediate input, because
the "high-tech" sector X, which uses skilled labor, is more responsive to infrastructure
expenditures than the other sector Y that uses unskilled labor, as reflected in the fact that JJ, is
less than unity.
The rate of return on human capital formation, in the steady state, must also be equal to
the world rate of interest. We therefore have
p[Q(r,LA),S] = r (11)
We now turn to the specification of preferences and demand. Suppose that all agents
have identical and homothetic utility functions with respect to their consumption of the two final
goods
u = u(cx,cy) (12)
where cx and cy refer to the per capita consumption of two goods in the economy. We can
think of u itself as being a sub-utility function embedded in a broader utility function
W = LxGu^-X) (13)
where LQ is the level of final public services provided by the government. Total public
expenditure is
E = w(LG+LA) (14)
which we initially assume to be financed by lump-sum taxes, the consequences of more realistic
taxes being left till later.
We now turn to the solution of the model. It is convenient to initially fixLo , the level of
public services. For any value of LA , the public intermediate input, the production functions (1)
and (2), and the marginal productivity equations (6) to (9) all assume standard form. In Figure 1
we depict factor-price frontiers W and WW for X and Y respectively, showing the skilled
unskilled wages v and w as negative functions of the rate of interest r. The world rate of
interest f then determines v(r)and w(r) as the corresponding values of the skilled and unskilled
wages, and hence also determine their ratio 0(r). From (11) this determines the amount of
skilled labor S in the economy as S(r) as well. From (4) we then get L and from (5) Ly as well,
since LQ and LA are given. Knowing S and LY we can determine Kx and Ky and henceX
and Y from the production functions and marginal productivity equations. We therefore know
the value of tradable output at world prices which is
T=pX+Y (15)
This gives us the budget constraint for tradable goods consumed, C, as
C = (pcx + cy)N=pX+ Y+rAK (16)
where AK is the net capital-inflow or outflow of the small open economy which is
AK = KX + Ky-Kd (17)
the difference between the demand for capital (Kx + Ky) and the amount of capital Kd owned by
domestic residents, assumed constant. The per capita consumption levels c^and cy , and hence
exports and imports, are determined by consumers maximizing the utility function (12) subject to
the budget constraint (16).
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We have thus been able to find the level of per capita utility u corresponding to any
given value of LA . We now investigate the consequences of varying the level of LA , while
continuing to hold that of Lg fixed. From (6) and (7) we see that increasing LA must lead to
declines in the ratio of S to Kx in X and Ly to Ky in Y, since the marginal product of capital in
each sector must continue to be equal to the level of the world interest rate r. From (8) and (9)
we see that the rise in the ratio of capital to skilled and unskilled labor respectively in the two
sectors, combined with the rise in LA itself, must lead to increases in both v and w, the real
wages of each type of labor. From (10) we see that although both v and w rise the ratio 0 of v
to w must increase since the high-tech sector X is more responsive to infrastructure expenditures
than the other sector Y. This raises the rate of return on human capital formation p and so the
amount of skilled labor S in this economy must increase to drive p back to equality with the
world rate of interest r. Since S and LA increase, and LQ is constant, it follows that Ly must
fall. The output of the high-tech sector X must increase since LA and S both increase and the ratio
of Kx to S must rise. The output of Y, however, may rise or fall since the fall in Ly may be
off-set by the rise in LA and possibly Ky, since the ratio of Ky to Ly must rise. We can,
however, readily compute the new values of tradable output T and consumption expenditure
and hence the level of per capita utility u corresponding to the new level of LA .
In terms of Figure 1 the effect of the increase in LA is to shift both W and WW to the
right but W proportionately more than WW so that the ratio 9 of v to w is increased, as
indicated by the steeper slope of the line OO as compared to OO' in the lower right-hand
quadrant.
In Figure 2 we depict the level of per capital utility u corresponding to each value of LA .
It is drawn as the concave function HHf, which begins at the utility level u when LA is equal to
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zero, then rising to the maximum level u at LA equaLto LA and then falling thereafter. The
utility level u is what is attained with zero infrastructure, which is obviously too little. On the
other hand it is clear that too high a level of LA will result in too little labor being available for
production in the private sector, and hence too low a level of per capita utility from private
consumption. Thus there is some intermediate level LA of the public input that is optimal in
terms of this outcome for the given level of LG, which is the level u at the peak of the
function in Figure 2.
In Figure 3 we plot each such u corresponding to each possible level of LG as the
concave frontier GG. It is clear that raising LG must reduce the labor available for S , LA and
L y and so the optimal u for each LG must be less the higher is LG • To obtain the full optimum
of the whole model we now need only superimpose the indifference map in (U,LG) space defined
by the full utility function W{LQ, U) as specified in (13). The point of tangency Q. in Figure 3
determines the optimal values LG and u*. Given LGWQ can now obtain the corresponding
values of L*A, S*, L *Y, K*, K*,X* and Y*. We also get the optimal level C* of consumption
expenditure as
C*=pX* + r-rAK* (18)
from which the optimal per capita consumption c*x and c*y can be obtained by maximizing (12)
subject to (18). Denoting total consumption of X and Y by C*x and C*Y , after multiplication of
the per capita values by N, we get exports (X* - CJ) and imports (C*Y - Y), assuming that the
small open economy has a comparative advantage in the high-tech good X.
It will now be necessary to consider the interpretation of the "broad" utility function W,
that has the ordinary utility function u for private consumer goods and public services LG as
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separate arguments. One possibility is that this function represents the "true" preferences of all
the individuals, who are exactly alike, and that the government which has to choose LQ and LA
is the obedient agent of its principal, the citizens. In this case there is no doubt that the outcome
is indeed the optimal one, and that the levels of LG, LA and hence all other variables are exactly
what they should be to maximize the utility of each citizen. The choice between being an
unskilled or a skilled worker, if all individuals are equally endowed with ability, becomes
irrelevant since life-time opportunities would then be equal, the greater earnings of the skilled
being only enough to compensate them for foregone earnings and the direct costs of education.
Suppose, however, that people have identical preferences for private consumer goods, i.e.
everybody has the same «, but that they differ in X, the parameter that defines the relative weight
on public services relative to consumption of private goods in their over-all welfare. How then
would the system determine whose preferences were to count?
A popular option in the literature on political economy is the "median voter" theorem,
which states that the decision would be made, in a representative democracy under suitable
simplifying assumptions, by the voter whose preferences "break the tie" between those to his
"left" and to his "right."
More interesting, and also more realistic, is the possibility that there is, at least to some
degree, an "autonomy of the state" due to information asymmetries, transaction costs and so on.
Under these circumstances the ideology of the government would come into play in determining
the outcome for the allocation of resources in the society. We consider two sharply differing
approaches. One, which we may identify with the Scandinavian or British Labor Party type of
"welfare state" would lay great stress on public services, i.e. would have a high value of X in its
W function (13). The other is what Chalmers Johnson (1982) calls a "capitalist developmental
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state," of the East Asian variety, which seeks to enhance productivity of the private sector, and to
promote "high-tech" production and exports. Rather than using the distortionary, and hence
inefficient tools of tariffs or subsidies, however, it merely has a low value of X, i.e. skimps on the
welfare state type of public services.
As we can see from Figure 3, having the same resources and technology would make
both governments have the same concave opportunity locus GG between LG, and u , but the
tangents to GG of the highest W function would imply a high L*G in the welfare state and a low
L*G in the developmental state.
What are the consequences of "locational competition" of these two contrasting choices?
In the Welfare State LG is high so LA, and hence S, will both be low. Total factor productivity
in both sectors X and Y will not be high, because A(LA) will be low. Internationally mobile
capital will enter the economy, but investment will be relatively low since infrastructure and
skilled labor, the complementary factors, are relatively scarce. The wage differential 0, however,
will also be relatively small, because of the low level of infrastructure, which narrows the spread
between the marginal products of skilled and unskilled labor. Given p, and u , comparative
advantage would tend to favor the "traditional" Y sector rather than the "high tech," since
infrastructure and skilled labor are not so plentiful because of the preference for LQ •
For the "Capitalist Developmental State" on the other hand the skimping on LG frees
resources for allocation to LA,LY, and S, thus raising efficiency and wages in both sectors, but
relatively more in the high-tech sector X This also serves to attract more internationally mobile
capital into the economy. With the same technology and endowment this economy will have a
greater comparative advantage in high-tech production than the egalitarian welfare state.
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The implication of our analysis is thus that even in the absence of any selective
interventionist policies government policy ean have a significant effect on production, trade, and
factor prices and hence on the endogenously determined level of human capital formation.
Notice that there is no reason to consider the Capitalist Developmental State as being superior to
the egalitarian Welfare State, even though it performs better on the criteria of labor force quality
and total factor productivity in the private sector. The "price" for these achievements is the
reduction in the availability of public amenities and thus the over-all quality of life may noj be
preferred by its own citizens, were they but able to express their "true" preferences accurately.
Up to now we have been assuming that government expenditure on the public
intermediate input and final public services are financed by "lump-sum" taxes. It is time to
briefly consider the implications of more realistic alternatives. First, suppose that the sole tax is
a proportional tax on wage income, whether skilled or unskilled. Since the capital-intensities of
production in both sectors are tied down by the requirement that the marginal product of capital
be equal to the world rate of return, the gross earnings of labor in both sectors will remain the
same, given the value of LA , so the ratio 9 of v to w will remain unchanged. Thus the same
value of LA will correspond to the same value of skilled labor S. The concave frontier GG in
Figure 3 will remain unchanged and so therefore will the optimal values L*G , and u* . In other
words, a general proportional tax on labor will actually be fully "neutral" in its impact on the
general equilibrium of the whole economy and thus will behave exactly like a "lump-sum" tax.
The reason is intuitively clear. The total labor force is fixed and immobile, and the fact that the
tax is proportional means that it does not discriminate between skilled and unskilled labor and
therefore does not affect the rate of human capital formation.
A general tax on physical capital will, however, have severe deleterious effects on the
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economy. Since the after-tax rate of return must be equal to the given world rate of interest the
inflow of capital into each sector will be reduced to raise the before-tax rate of return by the
amount of the tax. Holding LA and LQ constant at their optimal levels L*A and L*G we know that
the utility of consumption of private goods must fall because of the reduction in physical capital.
Over-all utility must therefore fall, even afterZj is reduced and LA,S*, and Zy are raised in the
attempt to compensate for the reduction in physical capital when these variables are at their
original levels. Note that the incidence of the tax on capital is fully borne by domestic labor,
both skilled and unskilled, since this is in perfectly inelastic supply, but capital is in the
opposite situation of being perfectly elastic at the world rate of interest.
Let us now turn to consider selective subsidies and taxes. A popular measure associated
with the "Capitalist Developmental State," a good example of which is Singapore, is a subsidy to
capital investment in the "high-tech" sector. It is clear from our model that this will drive down
the marginal product of capital in X but raise the marginal product of skilled labor and hence the
skilled wage. Since the unskilled wage remains determined by the marginal product of capital in
the Y sector, still equal to the world rate of return, the return to human capital formation is
increased because of the rise in 6, and thus the economy is induced to have a larger stock of
skilled labor, inducing a further inflow of world capital into the domestic "high-tech" sector. Not
only is more capital attracted simply because of the subsidy but LA and S* axe raised as well,
making this sector of the economy even more attractive. The selective subsidy is therefore a
powerful tool for a "Capitalist Developmental State" that wants to enhance its high-tech
production and exports. Over-all utility will of course fall as a result of this intervention, but the
government might justify its actions on the grounds of dynamic externalities and "learning by
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doing" associated with the "high-tech" sector.
Subsidies to education could be another favorite device for an interventionist government.
By raising the stock of skilled labor they would serve to induce more capital to enter the
economy as well, thus enhancing "high-tech" production and exports even further.
I could go on further and extend the model in a number of ways. Determining relative
prices and the world rate of interest endogenously would be obvious candidates, as well as
introducing population growth and technological change. I have thought it better, however, to
concentrate first on the simplest possible model that allows us to discuss the impact of such
relatively unfamiliar measures as infrastructure spending and education subsidies on the pattern
of production and trade, since these are indicative of the novel issues that our conference
attempts to tackle under the rubric of "locational competition."
To avoid misunderstanding I should make it clear that I have no wish to necessarily
endorse any of the specific measures or the general approach that I have discussed in this paper.
While a serious and responsible case for market-friendly government intervention can be made,
at least in the East Asian context, as by Wade (1990) for example, the jury still appears to be out
on the true efficacy and applicability of these measures, even in the region where they have been
alleged to be the most successful.
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Endnotes
1. An important exception to this statement, of which I only became aware at the Kiel
conference itself, is the work of the late Stefan Sinn (1993) of the Kiel Institute. The approach to
the problem that he adopts is in the same spirit as the one that I develop in this paper. The
models that we use, however, are substantially different. He uses a two-period, one-good
Fisherian framework with a distinctly "macro" orientation while I adopt a trade-theoretic
structure with more emphasis on relative product and factor prices and a more explicit modeling
of government and its impact on the economy. A synthesis of the two approaches would be of
great interest.
2. This specification of the Ricardo-Viner model is adopted in the Ph.D. dissertation of my
student Filippo Cartiglia (1992).
3. We assume that the share of physical capital is the same in each sector to avoid
unnecessary taxonomy on which of the two sectors is the more capital-intensive.
4. The reason I have in mind is that a higher level of skilled labor, in the steady state,
requires a higher inflow of students into the educational system, raising costs at the margin and
so lowering the rate of return. For an explicit analysis see Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983).
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